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abstract distinction. Panabstractism takes 
abstract relations to be a fundamental fea-
ture of the world as we perceive it. In this, 
it has some features in common with struc-
tural realism, which claims that the modal 
(or nomological) structure of the world is 
“ontologically fundamental, in the sense of 
not supervening on the intrinsic properties 
of a set of individuals” (Ladyman & Ross 
2007: 130). Instead of viewing structure as 
primary and endorsing a kind of elimina-
tivism of the physical, as structural realists 
do, panabstractism posits an interdepen-
dence between and co-constitution of (our 
concepts of) the abstract and the concrete, 
remaining neutral on the question of onto-
logical priority.
« 11 » Whereas Bitbol calls conscious-
ness “concrete” (§20), panabstractism views 
it as something that arises from and may 
ultimately be explicable by the abstract re-
lations that are necessarily a constitutive 
part of concrete physical matter: existence 
as a physical object, whether in a posited 
mind-independent world or within experi-
ence, requires and is often defined in terms 
of the obtaining of certain abstract relations 
(see interview mentioned in Footnote 1 for 
further details). Conversely, abstracta can-
not exist independently of the physical mat-
ter or objects (or perceptions thereof) from 
which they are or have been abstracted. 
Even abstract relations between abstract 
concepts, including mathematical relations, 
depend ultimately on the objects from 
which they were once abstracted2 as well as, 
to be recognised as such, on the biological 
beings capable of identifying them as such.
« 12 » Panabstractism is an alternative 
to panpsychism with the advantage that it 
allows for a kind of proto-consciousness 
to have existed for as long as anything has 
been in existence, yet without positing any-
thing mysterious or counterintuitive. It is 
uncontroversial to say that abstract rela-
tions pervade physical matter, or at least 
the objects we perceive in conscious expe-
rience, whether they correspond to any-
thing in an external world or not. For ex-
2 | Had only one formless, indivisible thing 
ever existed in perception, how could we have 
developed the concepts two or three, let alone the 
concepts of geometry, multiplication, fractions or 
square roots?
ample, the transformation of water into ice 
has been found to correlate with a change 
in the precise hydrogen-oxygen-hydrogen 
bond angle within H2O molecules, which 
is 104.45°C in liquid water but 109°C in ice 
(Jurendic & Pavuna 2012: 85). The change 
in bond angle and the change of state occur 
together, with a full scientific explanation 
incorporating information about both the 
type of perceived physical change (liquid 
to solid) and the structural relational in-
formation regarding changes within the 
molecule.
« 13 » Panabstractism accepts the same 
epistemic constraints as Bitbol’s position; 
only conscious experience is directly acces-
sible, and it can be embraced without re-
linquishing the claim that lived experience 
is ontologically prior. Within conscious 
experience, however, we can differentiate 
conceptually between concrete objects and 
abstracta, recognising their interdepen-
dence and co-constitution. The distinction 
between the concrete and abstract allows 
us to set aside the mind/body dichotomy 
and focus on how consciousness might 
have developed from increasingly complex 
structures of abstract relations within and 
between living organisms, culminating in 
self-reference. I propose this approach, 
which I have only outlined very briefly, 
here, as an alternative way of addressing the 
hard problem.
Funding
The author received no funding from 
any source for this project.
Competing interests
The author declares that she has no 
competing interests.
References
Bitbol M. (2020) A phenomenological ontology 
for physics: Merleau-Ponty and QBism. In: 
Wiltsche H. & Berghofer P. (eds.) Phenom-
enological approaches to physics. Springer, 
Cham: 227–242. ▶︎ https://cepa.info/6933
Jurendic T. & Pavuna D. (2012) On fractal 
geometry for water implosion engineering. 
Water 4: 82–89
Ladyman J. & Ross D. (2009) Every thing must 
go: Metaphysics naturalized. Oxford Univer-
sity Press, New York.
Bryony Pierce completed her PhD at the University 
of Bristol. Her doctoral thesis was on “The Role of 
Consciousness in Action” and she has published 
papers on consciousness, philosophy of action, 
artificial intelligence and experimental philosophy. 
She is a former member of the European Science 
Foundation CNCC “CONTACT” research group, was 
an Honorary Research Associate at the University 
of Bristol until April 2018, and is a Founder 
Member of Experimental Philosophy Group UK.
Received: 21 February 2021 
Revised: 2 March 2021 
Accepted: 3 March 2021
Panqualityism 
as a Critical Metaphysics 
for Neurophenomenology
Andrea Pace Giannotta
University of Florence, Italy 
andreapacegiannotta/at/gmail.com
> Abstract • I examine Michel Bitbol’s 
proposal of a metaphysical counterpart 
of neurophenomenology, arguing that 
such a metaphysics should address the 
issue of the origin of consciousness. This 
can be accomplished through panquali-
tyism, which conceives of the subject 
and object of experience as grounded 
in a flow of pre-phenomenal qualities. I 
conclude by framing this view in terms 
of a critical metaphysics that is consis-




« 1 » Francisco Varela proposes neuro-
phenomenology as a methodological reme-
dy to the hard problem of consciousness, i.e., 
the problem of explaining how conscious ex-
perience arises and what its relationship with 
the natural world is. In contrast to the search 
for a metaphysical solution to this problem 
(e.g., by adding an “extra ingredient” to the 
furniture of the world that is described by 
physics, as in David Chalmers’s “naturalistic 
property dualism,” Chalmers 1996), Varela 
argues that we must develop a disciplined 
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ing a correlation between phenomenologi-
cal accounts of the structure of experience 
and neuro-cognitive accounts of brain pro-
cesses (Varela 1996: 343). Varela conceives of 
neurophenomenology as a methodological 
development of the enactive approach intro-
duced in The Embodied Mind (TEM; Varela, 
Thompson & Rosch 1991). This approach 
brings into question the search for an “abso-
lute ground […] that might by virtue of its 
‘own-being’ be the support and foundation 
for everything else” (TEM: 143). In the light 
of the Madhyamaka teachings, the authors of 
TEM connect this metaphysical foundation-
alism to the “grasping attitude” that is the 
fundamental source of existential suffering 
for human beings.
« 2 » In the target article, Michel Bitbol 
stresses the continuity between the anti-
metaphysical attitude of TEM and Varela’s 
neurophenomenology. At the same time, he 
acknowledges that this attitude can be un-
satisfying in the eyes of those who are con-
cerned with the question of the metaphysi-
cal relationship between consciousness and 
nature. This anti-metaphysical aspect of the 
enactive approach and neurophenomenol-
ogy can be an obstacle to its dissemination as 
a fruitful method for the rigorous investiga-
tion of the brain-experience correlation.
Bitbol’s metaphysical counterpart 
to neurophenomenology
« 3 » Then, Bitbol puts forward a meta-
physical counterpart of neurophenom-
enology that is, nonetheless, faithful to its 
fundamental tenets and, especially, to its 
pragmatic and existential dimension. The 
proposed metaphysics is centered on the 
acknowledgment of the embodied character 
of lived experience and is based on Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s “intra-ontology” (§21), 
which conceives of the manifestation of phe-
nomena as the result of a self-splitting of the 
flesh. With the latter concept, Merleau-Ponty 
refers to a primal ontological dimension that 
is the “locus and origin of the process of ob-
jectification” (§33).
« 4 » At first sight, Bitbol’s proposal 
seems to be close to a form of neutral mo-
nism – the view first developed by authors 
such as Ernst Mach (1914), William James 
(1912), and Bertrand Russell (1921, 1927) 
– which conceives of mind and matter as 
both grounded on a metaphysical dimension 
that precedes both and is therefore neutral 
to the mental/physical distinction. Bitbol, 
too, stresses that, in common with neutral 
monism, his proposal has a “monistic on-
tology and ternary structure (mind, matter 
and their unique source)” (§42). At the same 
time, Bitbol wants to differentiate neurophe-
nomenology from the various forms of neu-
tral monism, because of “Varela’s unambigu-
ously phenomenological stance” (§28).
« 5 » However, contrary to Bitbol’s 
opinion, his view seems to me to be closer 
to a form of neutral monism than he wants 
to admit. Indeed, I argued that panquality-
ism, which is a form of neutral monism, is 
a promising way of developing phenomenol-
ogy and neurophenomenology (Pace Gian-
notta 2020b, 2021).
The primacy of lived experience
« 6 » To support this idea, I would now 
like to discuss the reason given by Bitbol 
for setting aside a neutral monist reading of 
neurophenomenology. The main reason is 
Varela’s idea that “Lived experience is where 
we start from and where all must link back 
to, like a guiding thread” (Varela 1996: 334). 
However, one can ask: is this “primacy of 
lived experience” just epistemological (in the 
sense that knowledge “necessarily emerges 
from our lived experience,” Varela 1996: 
336), or is it also metaphysical, in the sense of 
being a doctrine about an ultimate or funda-
mental reality? Understanding the primacy 
of lived experience in metaphysical terms 
would lead phenomenology to an idealistic 
outcome. In §14 Bitbol acknowledges the 
objection repeatedly made to Edmund Hus-
serl’s phenomenology after its “transcenden-
tal turn,” in that it amounts to a form of “dog-
matic idealism.” In particular, the problem is 
that, within the transcendental phenomeno-
logical inquiry, the world turns out to be the 
correlate of the constitution by transcenden-
tal consciousness. Then, by identifying “pure 
conscious life” with “the whole of absolute 
being” (Husserl 1980: 51, cited in §13), tran-
scendental subjectivity seems to turn into a 
metaphysical principle that constitutes all 
reality.
« 7 » This is a problem with Husserl’s 
phenomenology that could also trouble Va-
rela’s view, if we take literally his claim that 
“by ‘Being’ one must understand nothing else 
than experience“ (Bitbol 2012: 165, empha-
sis in the original).1 An answer to this issue 
could be that phenomenological transcen-
dental idealism is a form of correlationism, 
claiming that we must confine ourselves to 
the fundamental subjective–objective cor-
relation and that it does not make sense to 
ask about something that is placed beyond it. 
This position seems to be consistent with Va-
rela’s view as expressed in TEM and reprised 
in Varela (1996: 339), with its focus on the 
“fundamental correlation” between the sub-
jective and the objective.
The origin of consciousness: 
genetic phenomenology and 
panqualityism
« 8 » However, the problem of this po-
sition is that it leaves no place for asking 
about the metaphysical origin of conscious-
ness or, better still, the origin of the concrete 
conscious being. In this way, this view clashes 
with the idea, defended on the other hand 
by Varela, that neurophenomenology can 
shed light on the “natural biological basis” 
of lived experience (Varela 1999: 267). This 
statement points to the possibility of “natu-
ralizing” consciousness and phenomenol-
ogy without, however – and this is crucial 
– firstly assuming a specific, i.e., objectivist, 
conception of nature (as is done by most of 
the current forms of naturalism, see Pace Gi-
annotta 2021). In my view, there is therefore 
a tension in Varela’s thought between the as-
serted primacy of lived experience and the 
possibility of investigating the natural origin 
of consciousness within a non-objectivist, 
broadened and “phenomenologized” con-
ception of nature.
« 9 » This is why neutral monism is an 
option that is worthy of being considered 
as a metaphysical counterpart of phenom-
enology and neurophenomenology. The 
guiding thread for developing this view is to 
ask about the genesis of the subject–object 
correlation, and therefore about the genesis 
of the concrete conscious subject and of its 
correlate, i.e., the world. To be more precise, 
this is a question that is tackled by Husserl’s 
“genetic phenomenology,” which, as Bitbol 
states, goes “beyond structure towards dy-
1 | Bitbol paraphrases this passage from Va-
rela (1976: 66): “By being here I mean, for the pur-
pose of this discussion, the same as experience, 
sense-of-self or direct-knowledge.”
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namics” (§57) and thus sheds light on the 
genesis of the concrete field of manifestation.
« 10 » In particular, in the writings on 
genetic phenomenology, Husserl develops 
an inquiry into the “genesis of constitution” 
(Husserl 2001: 641) that is, at the same time, 
the genesis of “monadic individuality,” i.e., 
the concrete conscious subject (Husserl 2001: 
635). In my view, Husserl’s genetic phenom-
enology comes very close to a form of neutral 
monism. This is because it investigates the 
process of constituting objects that is, at the 
same time, the constitution of a subject of 
experience, i.e., the co-constitution of subject 
and object in the cognitive process. In par-
ticular, my proposal of a neutral-monist de-
velopment of genetic phenomenology (Pace 
Giannotta 2020b, 2021) is to conceive of the 
“primal impressions” that are at the heart of 
inner time-consciousness as based on pre-
phenomenal qualities that, when structured 
in certain ways (namely, when they acquire 
the threefold structure impression-retention-
protention), give rise to a field of conscious-
ness and its objectual correlate. This inquiry 
can thus reveal the common genesis of sub-
jectivity (“monadic individuality”) and its 
objects out of fundamental, pre-phenom-
enal qualities. In particular, panqualityism 
(Feigl 1971; Chalmers 2016; Coleman 2015, 
2016) is a version of “Russellian monism” or 
“panprotopsychism” (Chalmers 2016) that 
conceives of qualities as the fundamental 
elements of a reality that, under certain cir-
cumstances, give rise to a subject’s experi-
ence.2 Panqualityism can face the question of 
the genesis of consciousness without leaving 
the phenomenological stance (i.e., by starting 
from the investigation of lived experience), 
claiming that “before” consciousness arises 
there is a flow of qualities, understood as “un-
sensed sensa” (Chalmers 2016: 42) or “unex-
perienced qualia” (ibid: 49), i.e., “qualitative 
without being yet phenomenally qualitative” 
(Coleman 2015: 84). When these qualities 
come to be structured in certain ways, in 
the sensorimotor interaction between the 
2 | This view is based on Russell’s (1927) 
claim that physics describes just the structural 
properties of objects of scientific inquiry, without 
telling us anything about their intrinsic or cate-
gorical properties. According to Russell, however, 
in the case of our nervous system, we also have 
direct knowledge of its intrinsic qualities.
nervous system of living creatures and their 
surrounding environment, a field of con-
sciousness correlated to a world arises. This 
process of structuring of fundamental quali-
ties can be investigated in the light of Varela’s 
neurophenomenology of time consciousness 
(Varela 1999). According to Varela (1999: 
273), the attainment of a state of transient 
synchrony by an assembly of neurons, which 
is modulated by the sensorimotor interaction 
of the organism with the environment, leads 
to the emergence of a cognitive act that has 
an incompressible duration, i.e., the “spe-
cious present” with its three-part structure: 
impression-retention-protention. In the light 
of panqualityism, we can conceive of the 
components of this process, i.e., the constitu-
ent neurons with their intrinsic rhythms that 
interact with the environment, as flows of 
pre-phenomenal qualities.
« 11 » This approach is consistent with 
the enactivist and neurophenomenological 
claim, based on the Madhyamaka, that sub-
ject and object are codependently originated 
(e.g., TEM: 226). However, instead of fram-
ing this view in anti-metaphysical terms (as 
happens in TEM), it is possible to frame it in 
terms of a neutral and processual metaphys-
ics, which conceives of subject and object as 
codependently arising from a flow of funda-
mental qualities, thus addressing the issue of 
the origin of consciousness.
« 12 » Concerning this point, however, 
Bitbol claims that, from the neurophenom-
enological standpoint, “the issue of the phys-
ical and neurophysiological origin of con-
sciousness is a non-starter, a question that 
does not even have to be formulated” (Bit-
bol 2012: 169). This is because, usually, this 
question presupposes a conception of the 
physical domain as a “fundamental Being.” I 
agree that this objectivistic and physicalistic 
assumption is a non-starter for phenomenol-
ogy and neurophenomenology, but I stress 
that one can drop this assumption in order 
to investigate, nevertheless, the genesis of a 
field of manifestation with its subject-object 
structure, thus discovering a neutral quali-
tative process that grounds both the mental 
and the physical. In my view, this concep-
tion is also consistent with Merleau-Ponty’s 
concept of the flesh (Merleau-Ponty 1963), 
which refers to a fundamental being that is 
qualitative and whose becoming and “self-
splitting” generates a field of manifestation.
Panqualityism as a critical 
metaphysics
« 13 » An objection to this proposal 
could be that neutral monism (hence pan-
qualityism) “requires one to adopt a ‘God’s 
eye viewpoint’ located somewhere above 
both psychè and physis” (§17). However, 
it would be so if this view claimed that we 
could obtain absolute knowledge of all real-
ity. However, neutral monists such as Mach, 
James and Russell claim, in various ways, 
that we cannot have such absolute knowl-
edge (e.g., Coleman 2015: 98). In this view, 
our knowledge of the fundamental qualities 
is limited to what we can experience given 
our biological makeup (e.g., human beings 
cannot have access to the fundamental quali-
ties that make up the experience of the bat, 
which perceives through echolocation, and 
its correlated Umwelt). Furthermore, one can 
add that both ordinary and scientific objects 
are the correlates of a process of constitu-
tion that also depends on relatively a priori 
conditions (Parrini 1998; Pace Giannotta 
2020a). This is a constructivist aspect of the 
conception of knowledge as constitution 
that is compatible with panqualityism and 
can make of it a “critical metaphysics” that 
is situated within the limits of our knowl-
edge (Kant 1990, cited in §10), in contrast 
with the objectifying epistemic attitude that 
turns the objects of cognition into something 
substantial and permanent. In this way, pan-
qualityism, developed as a critical metaphys-
ics, is consistent with Bitbol’s claim that a 
metaphysical position about consciousness 
should be “traced back to basic epistemic at-
titudes and basic experiences” (§9).
Conclusion
« 14 » I stress again an important aspect 
of Bitbol’s proposal in its faithfulness to the 
“latent message of neurophenomenology” 
(§9), which leads us to a shift “from dis-
course to ways of being” (§9). This is a prag-
matic and existential dimension of Varela’s 
view (Bitbol 2017: 151; Bitbol & Antonova 
2016: 356; Pace Giannotta 2017; Petitmen-
gin 2017: 146; Vörös 2017: 150). Varela 
(1996: 336) likens the pragmatics of the 
phenomenological reduction to the mind-
fulness-awareness meditative practice. This 
is conceived of as a transformative practice 
that can free the meditator from the existen-
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attachment to the concepts of a substantial 
self and of a substantial world. However, 
in my view, the source of the “grasping at-
titude” and the associated “Cartesian anxi-
ety” (TEM: 140–143) is not the search for a 
metaphysical foundation per se but a certain 
metaphysics, that derives from our ordinary 
objectifying attitude and assigns a privilege 
to the concepts of substance and perma-
nence (what Johanna Seibt 2013 refers to as 
“substance metaphysics”). On the contrary, 
I conceive of panqualityism as a processual 
and neutral metaphysics. Even if it aims at 
discovering the ground of the subject–ob-
ject and mind–world correlation, it finds a 
ground that is not “substantial” and “abso-
lute.” Therefore, this view is compatible with 
an understanding of the impermanence and 
emptiness of any substantial reality of the 
self and the world that is at the basis of the 
pragmatic and existential dimension of neu-
rophenomenology.
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